How Genuine is the Paradox of Irrationality? :: Davidson Paradoxes Irrational Essays

How Genuine is the Paradox of Irrationality?ABSTRACT In light of interpreting a paradox of irrationality, vaguely expressed by Donald Davidson in the context of explaining helplessness of will, I attempt to show that it contains a significant thesis regarding the cognitive as well as motivational basis of our prescriptive practice. First, an irrational act must involve two a rational broker and a non-rational element at its core. Second, irrationality entails free and intentional violation of fundamental norms which the agent deems right or necessary. Third, normative interpretation is only possible for objects that are both natural events and capable of mental operations which presuppose some freedom of will as well as constructive representation of the surrounding reality. Fourth, at that place is always a question of whether we strike the best balance between fitting individual mental items consistently with the overall behavior pattern and care our critical ability in follow ing certain normative principles which constitute our rational background. Fifth, the paradox of irrationality reflects and polarizes a deep-seated tension in the normative human practice under the ultimate constraints of nature. Finally, the ultimate issue is how we can find the best lines on which our normative rational standards are based-best in the sense that they are close enough to limits of human practical potentialities and are not too high as to render our normative standards idle or even disastrous.In Paradoxes of Irrationality, Davidson has the following remark, which arises from, but is not limited to, the explanation of weakness of willThe underlying paradox of irrationality, from which no theory can tout ensemble escape, is this if we explain it too well, we turn it into a concealed form of rationality while if we assign incoherence too glibly, we merely compromise our ability to advert irrationality by withdrawing the background of rationality needed to justify al l diagnosis at all. (1)Many theorists who try to provide an adequate explanation of weakness of will and its bearing on the issue of rationality fail to fully appreciate the implication of the above remark, which I believe is an important thesis for any attempt to understand the source of many apparent puzzles around akrasia. Perhaps this failure is partly due to the fact that Davidson himself does not make it clear how primaeval this thesis will be for exploring the cognitive as well as motivational basis of our normative practice. In this paper, I shall discuss in character I the conceptual ingredients of being irrational, viz.